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THE PENDULUM CONTINUES TO SWING IN THE WRONG 
DIRECTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT MOVES 
CLOSER TO THE EDGE OF THE PIT:  
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN 
FREEHOLDERS 
Amanda Laufer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The following excerpt comes from a short story written by Edgar 
Allan Poe called “The Pit and the Pendulum”: 
Very suddenly there came back to my soul motion and sound—
the tumultuous motion of the heart, and in my ears the sound of 
its beating.  Then a pause in which all is blank.  Then again 
sound, and motion, and touch, a tingling sensation pervading my 
frame. Then the mere consciousness of existence, without 
thought, a condition which lasted long.  Then, very suddenly, 
THOUGHT, and shuddering terror, and earnest endeavour to 
comprehend my true state.  Then a strong desire to lapse into in-
sensibility . . . . So far I had not opened my eyes . . . . Perspiration 
burst from every pore, and stood in cold big beads upon my fore-
head.  The agony of suspense grew at length intolerable . . . .
1
 
Although this passage is about the torments endured by a prisoner 
awaiting a death sentence during the Spanish Inquisition, Poe’s de-
scription effectively can be likened to the experience that an individ-
ual arrested on a minor offense endures when subjected to a strip 
search at a detention facility. 
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence and his wife were driving on 
Route 295 in Burlington County, New Jersey when a state trooper 
pulled them over for speeding.
2
  The state trooper ran Florence’s 
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 1 EDGAR ALLAN POE, THE PIT AND THE PENDULUM: THE ESSENTIAL POE 56 (2009).    
 2 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011); Guy Sterling, A Mistaken Warrant, Six Days in Jail and 
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identification and found an outstanding bench warrant from April 
25, 2003, which charged Florence with a non-indictable variety of civil 
contempt.
3
  Florence challenged the validity of the warrant and pro-
duced documentation showing that he had paid the fine two years 
earlier,
4
 but to no avail.  The state trooper arrested Florence and took 
him to the Burlington County Jail (BCJ).
5
  Upon his arrival, correc-
tions officers subjected Florence to a strip search and visual body cav-
ity search.  Florence “was directed to remove all of his clothing, then 
open his mouth and lift his tongue, hold out his arms and turn 
around, and lift his genitals” while an officer sat at an arm’s-length 
distance in front of him.
6
  Following the search, officers directed Flo-
rence to shower and held him at BCJ for six days until the Essex 
County Sheriff’s Department took custody and transported him to 
the Essex County Correctional Facility (ECCF).
7
  Upon his arrival at 
the correctional facility, the officers subjected Florence to another 
strip search and visual body cavity search.
8
  Two corrections officers 
directed him to strip naked and observed him while he showered.
9
  
Next, he was “directed to open his mouth and lift his genitals,” and 
then “ordered to turn around so he faced away from the officers and 
to squat and cough.”
10
  After the searches, Florence entered the gen-
eral population of the jail.
11
  The following day, the state dismissed 
the charges against him and he was released.
12
 
For the past thirty years, the constitutionality of strip searches in 
custodial facilities has been subject to ongoing debate.  Although the 
majority of circuit courts have ruled on the issue, the Third Circuit 
did not address it until the case of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freehold-
ers, which was decided on September 21, 2010, in an opinion by 
Judge Hardiman.
13
  Since the case was one of first impression, this rul-
ing has major implications for both individuals and jails throughout 
the Third Circuit.  Moreover, because the Supreme Court granted 
 
Two Strip Searches, THE STAR LEDGER (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.appellate-
brief.com/ClassActs/Florence/Starldgp1.htm. 
 3 Florence, 621 F.3d at 299.  
 4 Id.; Sterling, supra note 2. 
 5 Florence, 621 F.3d at 299.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.  
 10 Id. 
 11 Florence, 621 F.3d at 299. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 296. 
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certiorari in the case,
14
 the implications will likely extend even fur-
ther, including the setting of a national policy regarding strip 
searches. 
Decades before the Third Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court 
examined the blanket strip-search policy at the Metropolitan Correc-
tional Center (MCC), a federal short-term custodial facility designed 
to house pretrial detainees, in the 1979 case Bell v. Wolfish.
15
  This pol-
icy required inmates “to expose their body cavities for visual inspec-
tion as part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a 
person from outside the institution.”
16
  In evaluating the constitutio-
nality of the searches, the Court articulated a test of reasonableness, 
namely, a balancing test
17
 that became “the touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis in the strip search context.”
18
  In applying this 
balancing test, the Court found that MCC’s policy was constitutional
19
 
and concluded that visual body cavity searches of inmates after con-
tact visits could be “conducted on less than probable cause” because 
the security interests involved outweighed the inmates’ privacy inter-
ests.
20
 
The ambiguity of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell has left 
the lower courts without much guidance regarding the appropriate 
application of the Bell holding to strip-search policies in contexts oth-
er than post-contact visits.
21
  Notwithstanding this lack of guidance, 
nearly every federal circuit court has since held that blanket strip-
search policies utilized by jails during booking procedures and appli-
cable to all arrestees, even to those charged with minor offenses, vi-
olate the Fourth Amendment absent reasonable suspicion that an in-
dividual arrestee was concealing a weapon or other contraband.
22
  
 
 14 Id. at 299. 
 15 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). 
 16 Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. at 559.  For a discussion of the Bell balancing test, see infra Part II.B.  
 18 Gabriel M. Helmer, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Sus-
picion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 249 (2001). 
 19 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.  
 20 Id. at 560. 
 21 Andrew A. Crampton, Note, Stripped of Justification: The Eleventh Circuit’s Aboli-
tion of the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for Booking Strip Searches in Prisons, 57 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 893, 904−05 (2009) (“Because of the ambiguity of the [Bell] decision, sub-
sequent courts that had to determine the validity of prison facility strip searches that 
took place outside the particular context of contact visit had the difficult task of de-
ciding how to apply and interpret the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Jones, 
251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993); Masters v. 
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Starting in 2008, however, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits disrupted 
this uniformity when they overturned their prior precedents.  These 
courts upheld blanket strip-search policies that applied to all arres-
tees during booking as constitutional, regardless of whether there was 
reasonable suspicion.
23
 
In the wake of this recent trend, in Florence, a ruling of first im-
pression, the Third Circuit joined the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in 
upholding the blanket strip-search policies of two custodial facilities 
in New Jersey, BCJ and ECCF.
24
  This Comment argues that the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Florence was wrong.  The court not only ignored 
the overwhelming majority of contrary jurisprudence in other cir-
cuits, but the court also overlooked many persuasive district court de-
cisions within the Third Circuit itself.  Moreover, the Third Circuit 
failed to recognize the factual differences between Florence and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell.  The holding in Bell is not control-
ling outside of the context of post-contact visit strip searches.  Finally, 
the Third Circuit failed to give adequate weight to the significant in-
trusion of bodily privacy that individuals endure during strip 
searches. 
Part II of this Comment will examine the evolution of the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the context of unreasonable searches 
 
Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1989); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 
739 (8th Cir. 1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by Bull 
v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Hill v. Bo-
gans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 
(7th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Powell v. Bar-
rett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“For almost thirty 
years, circuit courts have followed the Bell Court’s instructions and, until today, un-
iversally held that reasonable suspicion is necessary to constitutionally justify the 
types of searches before us.”).  
 23 See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1314; Bull, 595 F.3d at 975; see also Florence v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 304−05 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
1816 (2011) (noting that the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits reversed prior precedent 
and upheld blanket strip-search policies). 
 24 Florence, 621 F.3d at 311 (“In sum, balancing the Jails’ security interests at the 
time of intake before arrestees enter the general population against the privacy in-
terests of the inmates, we hold that the strip search procedures described by the Dis-
trict Court at BCJ and ECCF are reasonable.”); see also Shannon P. Duffy, Joining 
Trend, 3rd Circuit Upholds Jails’ Blanket Strip Search Policy, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 
22, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202472378843&slreturn=1 (“The 
pendulum is now swinging in the other direction and the law is very much in flux as 
illustrated by Tuesday’s decision from the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that 
upheld blanket strip search policies in two New Jersey counties.  Voting 2-1, the 3rd 
Circuit decided to follow recent rulings by two of its sister circuits in holding that jails 
must be given broad powers to use a mandatory strip search for every new detainee 
in order to prevent the influx of weapons, drugs, and other contraband.”). 
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of an arrestee and provide an overview of the history of strip searches 
under the Fourth Amendment, including an in-depth analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s decision of Bell v. Wolfish.  Part III will examine the 
circuit split that developed post-Bell regarding the constitutionality of 
blanket strip-search policies applicable to arrestees charged with mi-
nor offenses.  Then, Part IV of this Comment will analyze the Third 
Circuit’s recent decision in Florence.  Part V will argue that the Third 
Circuit’s decision was wrong because the court, in upholding a blan-
ket strip-search policy applicable to all arrestees, misinterpreted the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Bell and failed to give adequate weight to 
the severe intrusion of an arrestee’s bodily privacy during strip 
searches.  Finally, Part VI will argue that the Supreme Court should 
reverse the Third Circuit and adopt the approach that the majority of 
circuit courts take: it is unreasonable and unconstitutional for a cor-
rectional facility to strip search a person arrested for a minor offense 
unless authorities have a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is 
concealing a weapon or other contraband.  This part will also ex-
amine the current composition of the Supreme Court and argue that 
it may not have been the right time for the plaintiffs to petition for 
certiorari considering the conservative leanings of the Roberts Court. 
II. THE BACKGROUND OF FOURTH AMENDMENT STRIP SEARCHES 
A. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment 
The United States places high value on protecting constitutional 
liberties, pursuant to which individuals have a right to be free from 
government intrusion in certain aspects of their lives.
25
  Specifically, 
the Fourth Amendment provides the following protections: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
 
 25 The text of the Constitution never explicitly uses the term “privacy,” but vari-
ous constitutional limits exist on governmental intrusion of an individual’s right to 
privacy.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (right to be free of unwarranted search or 
seizure); U.S. CONST. amend. I. (right to free assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(providing a substantive due process right to privacy); see also David C. James, Consti-
tutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (1982) 
(“One commentator has argued that prisoners retain a general constitutional right 
to privacy such as was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.” (internal 
citations omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (“[S]pecific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy.”). 
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ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
26
 
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches.
27
  The essential purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect an individual’s expectation of privacy by li-
miting the discretion of government officials in conducting searches 
and seizures.
28
  Two such limitations are the warrant and probable 
cause requirements, which provide that an officer must obtain a war-
rant issued on probable cause before a search and/or seizure can oc-
cur.
29
  Over time, however, as the jurisprudence of the Fourth 
Amendment evolved, the United States Supreme Court developed 
several exceptions to the warrant requirement.
30
  Among these, the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception is one of the most important.
31
  In 
1973, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Robinson that, when 
an arrest is lawful, a full-body search of a person is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment despite the absence of a warrant.
32
  One 
 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 27 See id.; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).  
 28 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (“The Fourth 
Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbi-
trary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and per-
sonal security of individuals.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) 
(“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy 
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see also Helmer, supra note 18, at 242−43 (“The essential pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon 
government searches and seizures and to limit the exercise of discretion by govern-
ment officials.”). 
 29 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Paul Shuldiner, Visual 
Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13 J. MARSH. L. REV. 273, 277 
(1979) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 179 (1949)). 
 30 Helmer, supra note 18, at 251 n.67 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
755−68 (1968); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218 (1973). 
 31 See Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; Shuldiner, supra note 29, at 277 (stating that the 
search incident to arrest exception is the most important and widespread exception 
to the warrant requirement).   
 32 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a 
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is 
the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, 
and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of 
the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.   
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scholar, Gabriel Helmer, explains that, in Robinson, the Court seemed 
to “suggest that the strip search of pretrial detainees may be analyzed 
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.”
33
  One year after Ro-
binson, the Court further extended the search-incident-to-arrest ex-
ception to the detention context in United States v. Edwards.
34
  None-
theless, the Supreme Court commented in a later case that Edwards 
was not addressing the circumstances in which a strip search of an ar-
restee is reasonable.
35
  According to Helmer, the search-incident-to-
arrest exception serves as an improper vehicle to analyze the constitu-
tionality of a strip search.
36
  Essentially, the “scope and intensity of 
strip and visual body cavity searches [is] more intrusive and not clear-
ly included by the catch-all ‘full search’ in Robinson.”
37
 
In order to truly understand the scope and intensity of a strip 
search, one should consider the following account of a woman de-
scribing her arrest for failure to obey a police officer at a protest and 
her subsequent experience of being strip-searched: 
After I removed all my clothes, the guard told me to turn 
around, bend all the way over, and spread my cheeks.  I’m not 
sure that I can really convey the emotional and physical complexi-
ty of the situation.  Bending over and ‘spreading my cheeks’ ex-
posed my genitalia and anus to a complete stranger, who had 
physical authority over me, so that she could visually inspect my 
body cavities. . . . 
The guard’s next set of instructions were to squat—and 
then—to hop like a bunny.  Remember, I’m still ‘spreading my 
cheeks,’ so I can’t use my arms to balance or assist me in the hop-
ping process. . . . I didn’t do it to the guards liking, so I had to do 
it over several times . . . . 
I stood, bent over, and hopped naked under orders and in 
view of at least two guards in a small room with a door open to a 
 
Id.; see also id. at 222−23 (“[T]he officer completely search[es] the individual and in-
spect[s] areas such as behind the collar, underneath the collar, the waistband of the 
trousers, the cuffs, the socks and shoes.”).  
 33 Helmer, supra note 18, at 252. 
 34 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974) (“[S]earches and seizures that could be made on the 
spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at 
the place of detention.”). 
 35 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 n.2 (1983). 
 36 Helmer, supra note 18, at 253 (“The difference in scope, intensity, and justifi-
cations between the search incident to arrest exception and the strip search in con-
finement require courts to consider these strip searches outside of the search inci-
dent to arrest exception.”); Schuldiner, supra note 29, at 279−80; see also Robinson, 
414 U.S. at 223 n.2 (explaining the full “field type search” that is permitted following 
an arrest based on probable cause).  
 37 Helmer, supra note 18, at 253. 
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hallway that passersby could see in for about 10 to 15 minutes.  
My genitalia and anus were exposed and viewable to anyone pass-
ing through the hallway for over 5 minutes.
38
 
Strip-search policies at custodial facilities can include strip searches, 
visual body cavity searches, or manual body cavity searches.
39
  In a 
strip search, “a prisoner is required to disrobe completely before a 
corrections official.  In addition, the inmate may be asked to open his 
mouth, display the soles of his feet, and present open hands and 
arms.”
40
  In a visual body cavity search, “[i]f the inmate is a male, he 
must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual 
inspection.  The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates are also 
visually inspected.  The inmate is not touched by security personnel 
at any time . . . .”
41
  A manual body cavity search “includes the physical 
probing of the rectum or vagina.”
42
  Regardless of what label one puts 
on the type of search, there is no question that these searches are 
more intrusive than the searches that the Supreme Court allowed in 
Robinson.
43
 
Most pertinent to Florence, the Fourth Amendment protects 
against governmental intrusions into areas where a person has a “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”
44
  To determine a person’s reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, one must consider both the nature of the 
search and the stage of the investigative process (i.e., pre-arrest, inci-
dent to arrest, pre-trial detention, or post-conviction).
45
  It is impor-
tant to understand that from the beginning of this nation’s history, 
 
 38 JUDY HANEY, STATEMENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 3–4 (2005), available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/ 
statements/haney_judith.pdf (statement to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons regarding her personal experience of being strip searched in Mi-
ami-Dade County).  Judy Haney was lead plaintiff in a federal class action suit filed 
against Miami-Dade County in March 2004 challenging the policies of strip searches 
and visual inspections of body cavities of women arrested for non-violent, non-drug- 
or non-weapons-related misdemeanors in Miami.  See Haney v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 
No. 04-20516, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27739 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2005) (explaining that 
the court approved the settlement agreement for all arrestees who did not opt-out).  
 39 See generally William J. Simonitsch, Comment, Visual Body Cavity Search, 54 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 665 (2000) (discussing the various types of strip searches and their 
characteristics).   
 40 James, supra note 25, at 1033 n.2. 
 41 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 n.39 (1979); see also James, supra note 25, at 
1033 n.2.  
 42 James, supra note 25, at 1033 n.2. 
 43 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 44 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 See Simonitsch, supra note 39, at 669−70 (explaining the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy present for an individual at each stage of the investigative process).  
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the Constitution did not afford protections to prisoners.
46
  However, 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, prisoners’ rights emerged as a result 
of the Civil Rights Movement.
47
  In 1974, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that “a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional pro-
tections” as “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitu-
tion and the prisons of this country.”
48
  Pretrial detainees 
subsequently gained the same constitutional protections as prison-
ers.
49
  Nevertheless, prisoners’ and detainees’ rights are sometimes 
limited because of the unique nature of custodial facilities and the 
need to maintain security at the facilities.
50
  For instance, in Hudson v. 
Palmer, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he curtailment of cer-
tain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a my-
 
 46 See SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: WITH LIBERTY 
FOR SOME 252 (1998) (“For the first 160 years or so of the nation’s history, the courts 
almost without exception had maintained a ‘hands-off’ or ‘out-of-sight, out-of-mind’ 
posture towards prisoners.”); Helmer, supra note 18, at 249 (“One early American 
court remarked: A convicted felon . . . .  has, as a consequence of his crime, not only 
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its hu-
manity accords to him.  He is for the time being a slave of the State.” (internal cita-
tion omitted)); Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Standard 
for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 165 (2003) (“Courts did not immediately interpret the Consti-
tution and Fourth Amendment as providing many rights to arrestees to be free of 
strip searches. Over time, this view began to evolve and some protections were ex-
tended.”). 
 47 Helmer, supra note 18, at 249.  “[The Supreme Court] extended constitutional 
rights to prisoners pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  Id. at 250;  see also 
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (holding that a state prisoner had a right to sue 
a prison official under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871); CHRISTIANSON, supra 
note 46, at 254 (explaining that Cooper confirmed that prisoners were protected un-
der the Civil Rights Act).  
 48 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555−56 (1974).  The Supreme Court has rei-
terated this notion over and over again.  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 
(1987) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the pro-
tections of the Constitution.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (“[W]e have 
held that convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of 
their conviction and confinement in prison.”). 
 49 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 (“[P]retrial detainees, who have not been convicted of 
any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by 
convicted prisoners.”).  
 50 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 
557 (“The fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the pen-
al institution limits these retained constitutional rights, [and thus,] any reasonable 
expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be of a diminished 
scope.”); Allison v. GEO Grp., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433, 455−56 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(“[B]ecause custodial facilities necessarily provide little in the way of personal priva-
cy, Fourth Amendment rights, which only exist where a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize, are significantly diminished in 
custodial settings.”).   
LAUFER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  2:03 PM 
392 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:383 
riad of ‘institutional needs and objectives’ of prison facilities chief 
among which is internal security.”
51
  In Hudson, the Court held that 
“the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches 
does not apply within the confines of the prison cell” because the 
prison inmate does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
there.
52
  It is important to note that the Court in Hudson was dealing 
with prisoners’ privacy rights in their cells, rather than with prison-
ers’/detainees’ expectation of bodily privacy. 
While there has been an exceptional amount of litigation re-
garding prisoners’ rights, there remains uncertainty as to body 
searches of arrestees and whether—and to what extent—the Consti-
tution protects their expectations of bodily privacy.
53
  This Comment 
focuses on the rights of detainees and arrestees to be free from un-
reasonable strip searches.  On several occasions, the Supreme Court 
has explained that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amend-
ment is ‘reasonableness.’”
54
  The Supreme Court has provided rela-
tively little guidance with respect to analyzing the reasonableness of 
Fourth Amendment challenges to strip searches of detainees and ar-
restees in custodial facilities.
55
  In fact, the Court’s “lone pronounce-
ment” on the reasonableness of strip searches of pretrial detainees in 
custodial facilities came in 1979 in Bell v. Wolfish.
56
 
B. Bell and the Balancing Test 
In Bell, the Supreme Court addressed the nature of constitution-
al rights afforded to pretrial detainees
57
 by establishing a balancing 
test, which “became the touchstone for Fourth Amendment analysis 
in the strip search context.”
58
  In this class action, pretrial detainees 
challenged numerous conditions of confinement at MCC, a federal 
short-term custodial facility in New York City designed to primarily 
 
 51 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524 (internal citation omitted).  
 52 Id. at 526. 
 53 James, supra note 25, at 1033. 
 54 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Samson v. California, 547 
U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); see also 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108−09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).   
 55 THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 153 (2009). 
 56 Id.; James, supra note 25, at 1038 n. 34 (explaining that since Bell, the Supreme 
Court has demonstrated its reluctance to review cases involving the legality of body 
searches of prisoners by denying certiorari in all such cases).  
 57 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 521 (1979) (explaining that a pretrial detainee is 
an individual who is charged with a crime but has not been tried on that charge).  
 58 Helmer, supra note 18, at 242.  
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hold pretrial detainees.
59
  One of the issues before the Court was a 
challenge to the strip-search policy at MCC, which subjected all in-
mates, regardless of the reason for their detention, to a visual body 
cavity inspection following every contact visit with a person from out-
side the facility.
60
  Specifically, the search required the following: 
If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to 
spread his buttocks for visual inspection.  The vaginal and anal 
cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.  The inmate 
is not touched by security personnel at any time during the visual 
search procedure.
61
 
The district court held that the blanket visual body cavity searches 
were unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment be-
cause they were conducted without probable cause.
62
  The Second 
Circuit affirmed, finding such a search to be a “gross violation of per-
sonal privacy.”
63
  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, White, and Blackmun, re-
versed the lower court decisions and held that the visual body cavity 
inspections at MCC were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
64
  
Justice Powell joined the majority in another part of the opinion, but 
dissented from the majority with respect to the body cavity searches 
because he viewed them as serious intrusions on a person’s privacy, 
which thereby required at least reasonable suspicion.
65
  Justice Mar-
shall dissented, expressing the view that the body cavity searches con-
stitute “one of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and 
common decency.”
66
  Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, opined in his dissent that there must be probable cause in order 
to justify such searches of pretrial detainees.
67
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the strip-search policy 
at MCC by explaining that a strip search “instinctively gives us the 
most pause.”
68
  In discussing the appropriate test for evaluating con-
stitutional claims of detainees, the Court noted that both convicted 
 
 59 Bell, 441 U.S. at 523. 
 60 Id. at 558.  
 61 Id. at 558 n.39.  
 62 United States ex. rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d. Cir. 1978), rev’d sub 
nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 63 Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131.  
 64 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.  
 65 Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 66 Id. at 576−77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 68 Id. at 558 (majority opinion). 
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prisoners and pretrial detainees retain some Fourth Amendment 
rights upon admittance to a correctional facility.
69
  Yet, the Court ex-
plained that these rights are subject to restrictions due to the institu-
tion’s goals of maintaining security and preserving order.
70
  The prob-
lems that arise in the daily operation of custodial facilities can be 
challenging, and prison administrators “should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal or-
der and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”
71
  The 
Court deferred to the judgment of prison administrators because (1) 
“such considerations [regarding institutional security] are peculiarly 
within the province and professional expertise of corrections offi-
cials,” and (2) the operation of correctional facilities should be left to 
the authority of the legislative and executive branches, not the judi-
ciary.
72
 
In evaluating the searches at MCC, the Court explained that the 
test of reasonableness is “not capable of precise definition or me-
chanical application,” and therefore requires “a balancing of the 
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights 
that the search entails.”
73
  In balancing these dual interests, courts 
must consider the following four factors: (1) the scope of the particu-
lar intrusion, (2) the manner in which it is conducted, (3) the justifi-
cation for initiating it, and (4) the place in which it is conducted.
74
  In 
applying the balancing test, the Court noted that with regard to the 
scope of the intrusion, it did not “underestimate the degree to which 
these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”
75
  With 
regard to the manner in which prison officials conduct the searches, 
the Court noted that there is potential for abuse, but the Court em-
phasized that it did not condone such conduct.
76
  Nonetheless, the 
Court accorded great deference to the security needs and prison ad-
ministrators’ justifications, explaining that “[a] detention facility is a 
unique place fraught with serious security dangers.”
77
  The Court 
found that MCC had legitimate security concerns, which consisted of 
 
 69 Id. at 545, 558.  
 70 Bell, 441 U.S. at 545−46. 
 71 Id. at 547. 
 72 Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id. at 559.  
 75 Id. at 560. 
 76 Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.  
 77 Id. at 559. 
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preventing and deterring the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other 
contraband into the facility.
78
  This concern persuaded the Court be-
cause smuggling was both common and documented at MCC and in 
other cases.
79
  Although MCC officials detected only one instance of 
smuggling contraband, the Court found that this served as proof that 
the policy was effective.
80
 
In the end, the Court found that the institution’s security inter-
ests outweighed the intrusion of an inmate’s privacy interest, and 
held the searches conducted after planned visits from outsiders at 
MCC were not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
81
  The 
Court failed to specify the level of cause required to uphold these 
policies, but limited its ruling by acknowledging that its holding was 
only “deal[ing] here with the question of whether visual body-cavity 
inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be conducted 
on less than probable cause.  Balancing the significant and legitimate 
security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the 
inmates, [the Court concluded] that they can.”
82
 
III. THE BELL-PROGENY AND BLANKET STRIP-SEARCH POLICIES DURING 
BOOKING PROCEDURES 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bell was limited to a blanket 
strip-search policy of all detainees on less than probable cause after 
contact visits with individuals from outside the institution.
83
  There-
fore, the Bell decision provided little guidance to lower courts on how 
to apply the holding to strip-search policies in other contexts (i.e., 
searches that take place during booking procedures) and what level 
of cause was required for such searches to be reasonable and to com-
port with the Fourth Amendment.
84
  Notwithstanding the lack of clar-
 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. (citing Ferraro v. United States, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Park, 521 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1975)).  When discussing the problem of smuggling, 
however, both cases “document” the problem of smuggling contraband during a 
planned contact visit.  
 80 Id. at 559 (noting that it serves as “a testament to the effectiveness of this 
search technique as a deterrent”). 
 81 Id. at 558, 560.  
 82 Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.  
 83 Id.  
 84 See Crampton, supra note 21, at 904−05 (“Because of the ambiguity of the [Bell] 
decision, subsequent courts that had to determine the validity of prison facility strip 
searches that took place outside the particular context of contact visit had the diffi-
cult task of deciding how to apply and interpret the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Bell.”). 
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ity, the vast majority of circuit courts used the Bell balancing test to 
assess the constitutionality of blanket strip-search policies as applied 
to arrestees charged with minor offenses upon admission to a cus-
todial facility.
85
  For decades, these circuit courts have uniformly held 
that jails could not employ blanket strip searches of all arrestees ab-
sent reasonable suspicion that the individual was concealing a wea-
pon, drugs, or other contraband.
86
 
A. The Majority View and the Requirement of Reasonable Suspicion 
For the past thirty years, the majority of federal courts have pro-
hibited blanket strip-searches of arrestees employed during booking 
procedures without an articulation of reasonable suspicion that the 
individual was harboring drugs or other contraband.
87
  The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago
88
 provided “the cat-
alyst for this movement.”
89
  In 1983, the Seventh Circuit addressed a 
challenge to the City of Chicago’s blanket strip-search policy when of-
ficers arrested three women for misdemeanor offenses involving mi-
nor traffic violations and strip searched them in accordance with the 
city’s policy.
90
  The policy required a strip search and visual body cavi-
ty inspection of all arrested and detained women regardless of 
whether the prison officials had reasonable belief that the arrestees 
were hiding weapons or contraband.
91
  This policy did not apply to 
male arrestees; in fact, male arrestees were only subject to a strip 
search if officers reasonably believed that the arrestees were conceal-
ing weapons or contraband.
92
  Specifically, the policy required that 
 
 85 See cases cited supra note 22. 
 86 See cases cited supra note 22; see also Helmer, supra note 18, at 279 (“It is well 
settled that blanket policies allowing strip searches of misdemeanor detainees are 
invalid because they require no level of cause to strip search the detainee.”).   
 87 See cases cited supra note 22; see also Crampton, supra note 21, at 905 (“[N]early 
all the federal courts faced with booking strip searches post-Bell chose the latter 
route, quickly selecting reasonable suspicion as the appropriate level of cause re-
quired.”).  
 88 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 89 Simonitsch, supra note 39, at 683; see also, Crampton, supra note 21, at 905 
(“The first court to apply a specific standard of cause required for booking strip 
searches was the Seventh Circuit . . . .”). 
 90 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2 (explaining that the arrests and detentions 
were not identical, but that all involved women were arrested for misdemeanor of-
fenses: two women were stopped for traffic violations and arrested for outstanding 
parking tickets, and another was arrested for failure to produce her driver’s license 
after making an improper left turn).   
 91 Id. at 1266.  
 92 Id. at 1268.  
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female police personnel search every woman in detention in the fol-
lowing manner: 
(1) [to] lift her blouse or sweater and to unhook and lift her bras-
siere to allow a visual inspection of the breast area, to replace 
these articles of clothing and then (2) to pull up her skirt or dress 
or to lower her pants and pull down any undergarments, to squat 
two or three times facing the detention aide and to bend over at 
the waist to permit visual inspection of the vaginal and anal area.
93
 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by setting forth the evolu-
tion of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through Bell.
94
  The 
court explained that because the Fourth Amendment prohibits “un-
reasonable” searches, its task was to determine if the city’s strip-search 
policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
95
  The court 
noted that, generally, searches cannot be conducted without a war-
rant, but exceptions exist where a warrantless search may be consi-
dered reasonable.
96
  The city argued that its policy was valid under 
two exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) a search incident to 
arrest
97
 and (2) a search incident to detention of a person lawfully ar-
rested.
98
  Nonetheless, the court examined the cases setting forth 
these exceptions to the warrant requirement and rejected the appli-
cability of these holdings.
99
  Rather, the court found that strip 
searches are more intrusive than searches incident to arrest.
100
  Specif-
ically, the court noted that, while the Supreme Court in Bell evaluated 
the scope of permissible searches incident to incarceration, Bell was 
not controlling “because the particularized searches in that case were 
initiated under different circumstances.”
101
  The court distinguished 
 
 93 Id. at 1267.   
 94 Id. at 1268.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1268. 
 97 Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Edwards, 
415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).  
 98 Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Edwards, 415 U.S. at 804−05 
n.6). 
 99 Id. at 1271−73. 
 100 Id. (“We cannot say that the breadths of the exceptions relied on by the City 
clearly extend to the circumstances that exist in these cases.”).  The court explained 
that “the Robinson Court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intru-
sions that occurred here.  Similarly, the searches in the cases before [the court] are 
qualitatively different from the delayed custodial searches upheld in Edwards.”  Id.  
Further, the court explained that Bell “is also not controlling because the particula-
rized searches in that case were initiated under different circumstances.”  Id. 
 101 Id. at 1271−72. 
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Bell by explaining that (1) in Bell, “the detainees were awaiting trial 
on serious federal charges,”
102
 while in Mary Beth G., the detainees 
were minor offenders waiting to post bond and that (2) in Bell, detai-
nees were searched after contact visits, whereas the searches were 
conducted during booking in Mary Beth G.
103
 
The Seventh Circuit engaged in its own inquiry as to whether the 
strip-search policy was “reasonable” and began its analysis by using 
the Bell balancing test.
104
  Starting with the scope of the invasion, the 
court found that the strip searches were a severe intrusion on the pri-
vacy and dignity of the individual.
105
  The Seventh Circuit explained 
that visual body cavity searches that inspect the anal and genital areas 
are “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, 
unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and sub-
mission.”
106
  The court noted that the city sought to justify these 
searches claiming they were necessary to maintain security in the fa-
cilities in order to prevent the influx of weapons or contraband by 
female minor offenders;
107
 yet, the record did not support this justifi-
cation.
108
  The court acknowledged the difficulty in balancing these 
interests and explained that jail security is a legitimate concern, but 
found that “the strip searches bore an insubstantial relationship to 
security needs.”
109
  Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the city’s policy 
 
 102 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1271−72 (“Absent precedent that is clearly controlling, it is incumbent 
on us to examine independently the searches conducted here in light of the re-
quirement of the [F]ourth [A]mendment that they not be unreasonable.”(internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
 105 Id. at 1272. 
 106 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 107 Id.  
 108 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272−73.  
 109 Id. at 1273 (citing Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981)).  In Logan, a 
woman was arrested for a DWI and subjected to a visual strip search at a detention 
center.  Logan, 660 F.2d at 1009−10.  Under the policy, all persons regardless of their 
offense were subject to a strip search.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit, applying the standards 
of Bell, described the search as “the ultimate invasion of personal rights” and held 
that the policy was unconstitutional.  Id. at 1013.  The court explained that “[a]n in-
discriminate strip search policy routinely applied to detainees . . . cannot be constitu-
tionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security 
considerations.” Id.  The Fourth Circuit found that the “strip search [of Logan] bore 
no such discernible relationship to security needs at the Detention Center that, when 
balanced against the ultimate invasion of personal rights involved, it could reasona-
bly be thought justified.” Id.; see also Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984).  In 
Hill, the Tenth Circuit, similarly to the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Logan in Mary 
Beth G., held that the strip search of a traffic offender was unconstitutional when 
there was no reasonable suspicion that he was concealing contraband.  Id. at 394.  
LAUFER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  2:03 PM 
2012] COMMENT 399 
was unreasonable because the need for the search was not substantial 
enough to justify the strip search of a female arrestee charged with a 
minor offense without reasonable suspicion that the individual was 
concealing weapons or contraband.
110
 
Since Mary Beth G., other circuits have applied Bell in a similar fa-
shion when analyzing the constitutionality of strip-search policies ap-
plied to arrestees.
111
  Two years after Mary Beth G., the Fifth Circuit 
looked to the Seventh Circuit for guidance in analyzing a similar 
case.
112
  In Stewart v. Lubbock County, the county jail’s policy permitted 
strip searches of all arrestees, regardless of the severity of the offense 
or the degree of suspicion regarding the possession of weapons or 
other contraband, prior to both arraignment and the opportunity to 
post bail.
113
  The plaintiffs, who were subjected to strip searches based 
on arrests for minor misdemeanors, including public intoxication 
and traffic violations, challenged the policy’s constitutionality.
114
  The 
Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Seventh Circuit re-
lied on Bell for the standard of reasonableness and distinguished the 
 
The court noted that “intermingling is only one factor to consider in judging the 
constitutionality of a strip search.”  Id.  Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit extended its 
earlier ruling in Hill in Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding 
the blanket strip-search policy of detainees was unconstitutional).  The Tenth Circuit 
explained that “jails can meet the minimal security concerns they may have with mi-
nor offenders by means of a less intrusive pat-down search.”  Id. at 397 (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted).       
 110 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d. at 1272−73. 
 111 See Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The decisions of 
all the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue reached the same 
conclusion: a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor 
offense not normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon 
or other contraband, is unreasonable.”); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th 
Cir. 1985) (reviewing several other circuit cases, including Mary Beth G., and holding 
that a visual body cavity search of a misdemeanor detainee arrested for violation of a 
lease law, where police had no reason to suspect an arrestee was concealing a weapon 
or contraband, before entry into a holding cell was unreasonable under Bell); 
Crampton, supra note 21, at 906 (“[The Seventh Circuit] merely opened the flood-
gates for other courts to adopt the reasonable suspicion standard without first dis-
cussing whether the holding in Bell directly controls.”).  For discussion of the Stewart 
case, see infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.   
     The Sixth Circuit explained that “authorities may not strip search persons ar-
rested for traffic violations and nonviolent minor offenses solely because such per-
sons will ultimately intermingle with the general population at a jail when there were 
no circumstances to support a reasonable belief that the detainee will carry weapons 
or other contraband into the jail.”  Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255. 
 112 See Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 113 Id. at 154.  
 114 Id.  
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Bell holding by explaining the difference between the types of detai-
nees in each case.
115
  In the end, the Fifth Circuit held that, under the 
Bell balancing test, the searches were unreasonable and violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the policy applied to minor offenders 
“when no reasonable suspicion existed that they as a category of of-
fenders or individually might possess weapons or contraband.”
116
 
Similarly, in the 1986 case Weber v. Dell, the Second Circuit, ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the strip-search policy at the Monroe 
County Jail, which authorized the search of all arrestees booked into 
jail, regardless of whether there was reasonable suspicion that the ar-
restees were concealing contraband.
117
  Police arrested the plaintiff 
for a misdemeanor offense of falsely reporting an incident and resist-
ing arrest.
118
  Once the plaintiff was taken into custody, officials strip 
searched her.
119
  The court explained that Bell “did not . . . read out of 
the Constitution the provision of general application that a search be 
justified as reasonable under the circumstances.”
120
  The Second Cir-
cuit held that 
the Fourth Amendment precludes prison officials from perform-
ing strip/body cavity searches of arrestees charged with misde-
meanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a rea-
sonable suspicion that the arrested is concealing weapons or 
other contraband based on the crime charged, the particular cha-
racteristics of the arrested, and/or the circumstances of the ar-
rest.
121
 
In Roberts v. Rhode Island, the First Circuit held that, based on its 
previous ruling,
122
 the Rhode Island Department of Corrections’ 
 
 115 Id. at 156.    
 116 Id. at 156−57. 
 117 804 F.2d 796, 797−98 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 118 Id. at 799. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. at 800. 
 121 Id. at 802; see also Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[The court 
rejected the defense of qualified immunity because] it was clearly established in 1995 
that persons charged with a misdemeanor and remanded to a local correctional facil-
ity like NCCC have a right to be free of a strip search absent reasonable suspicion 
that they are carrying contraband or weapons . . . .”).  The Second Circuit distin-
guished Bell because “Bell authorized strip searches after contact visits where contra-
band is often passed.  It is far less obvious that misdemeanor arrestees frequently or 
even occasionally hide contraband in their bodily orifices.”  Id. at 64 (internal cita-
tion omitted).   
 122 See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (“A strip and visual body cavi-
ty search of an arrestee must be justified, at the least, by reasonable suspicion.”).  The 
First Circuit employed the Bell balancing test and explained that the searches at issue 
“impinge seriously upon the values that the Fourth Amendment was meant to pro-
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blanket strip-search policies were unconstitutional, and the court re-
quired that officers have reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is har-
boring weapons or other contraband in order for a search to be rea-
sonable.
123
  In Roberts, officers stopped a car, in which the plaintiff was 
a passenger, for an expired registration sticker.
124
  The officers de-
termined that Roberts was the subject of an “outstanding body at-
tachment,”
125
 frisked him, placed him into custody, and subsequently 
conducted a strip and visual body cavity search.
126
 
The court applied the Bell balancing test and explained that the 
search was an extreme intrusion on an individual’s personal priva-
cy.
127
  Next, the court looked at the government’s justification for the 
search, which was to maintain institutional security.
128
  In evaluating 
this justification, the First Circuit noted that the smuggling of contra-
band is less likely to occur subsequent to an arrest than during a con-
tact visit.
129
  Additionally, in the arrestee context, the deterrent justifi-
cation for strip searches that Bell provided is “simply less relevant 
given the essentially unplanned nature of an arrest and subsequent 
incarceration.”
130
  In the end, the court found that “Bell has not been 
read as holding that the security interests of a detention facility will 
always outweigh the privacy interests of the detainees” and held that 
the blanket strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses 
violate the Fourth Amendment.
131
 
Overall, the majority of circuits have applied the Bell balancing 
test in cases involving individuals arrested for minor offenses and sub-
jected to blanket strip searches absent reasonable suspicion and upon 
admission to a custodial facility; these courts have held that such 
 
tect.”  Id. at 6.  Further, the court explained that the search constitutes a “severe if 
not gross interference with a person’s privacy.”  Id.  
 123 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 124 Id. at 108. 
 125 Id. (“[Under Rhode Island law] a magistrate has the power to issue a ‘body at-
tachment’ upon the failure of a party to appear for a judicial proceeding.”). 
 126 Id. at 108−09.  The search entailed corrections officers inspecting the inside of 
Roberts’ mouth and nose and soles of his feet.  Id.  He was ordered to spread his but-
tocks, during which time an officer inspected his body cavity.  Id.  No contraband was 
found during this process.  Id.  Later that day, Roberts was subject to a similar search.  
Id.  
 127 Id. at 110 (explaining that these searches constitute a “severe if not gross inter-
ference with a person’s privacy” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 128 Id. at 110−11. 
 129 Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 113 (citation omitted).  
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searches are unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Eleventh Circuit summarized this line of cases as follows: 
While those decisions vary in detail around the edges, the picture 
they paint is essentially the same.  The arrestee is charged with 
committing a misdemeanor or some other lesser violation and, 
while being booked into the detention facility, she is subjected to 
a strip search pursuant to the facility’s policy.  She later sues the 
officials asserting that the search was unconstitutional because the 
guards did not have any reasonable basis for believing that she 
was hiding contraband on her person.  In each cited case, the 
court of appeals concludes that because the plaintiffs were minor 
offenders who were not inherently dangerous, detention officials 
could conduct a strip search only where there was a reasonable 
suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing 
contraband.  In each of the cases where reasonable suspicion was 
lacking, the search is held to violate the Fourth Amendment.
132
 
Notwithstanding the uniformity among the circuits, everything came 
to a screeching halt in 2008. 
B. A Split Emerges Among the Circuits 
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit in Powell v. Barrett overruled its own 
precedent
133
 and departed from the majority view by upholding a sus-
picionless, blanket strip-search policy of all arrestees upon admission 
to a custodial facility.
134
  In Powell, eleven former detainees at Fulton 
County Jail in Georgia brought a class action suit after prison officials 
subjected them to strip searches upon entering or re-entering the 
 
 132 Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1309−10 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 133 Powell, 541 F.3d 1298 (overruling Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the blanket policy of strip searches upon intake to jail was unrea-
sonable when applied to DUI arrestee absent reasonable suspicion)).  Prior to Powell, 
the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “‘reasonable suspicion’ [wa]s sufficient to justify 
the strip search of a pretrial detainee.”   Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343. 
 134 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.  
Every person booked into the Fulton County Jail general population is 
subjected to a strip search conducted without an individual determina-
tion of reasonable suspicion to justify the search, and regardless of the 
crime with which the person is charged.  The booking process includes 
having the arrested person go into a large room with a group of up to 
thirty to forty other inmates, remove all of his clothing, and place the 
clothing in boxes.  The entire group of arrestees then takes a shower in 
a single large room. After the group shower each arrestee either singly, 
or standing in a line with others, is visually inspected front and back by 
deputies. 
Id. at 1301. 
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general population at the detention facility.
135
  The plaintiff class was 
divided into three groups.
136
  Only the action for one group was be-
fore the en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit.
137
  This group con-
sisted of arrestees who were strip searched during the booking 
process before being placed in the general population.
138
  The defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming they were entitled to quali-
fied immunity.
139
  The district court granted the motion, explaining 
that the unconstitutionality of the strip-search policy was not clearly 
established.
140
  On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel 
reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the policy was un-
constitutional under stare decisis.
141
  The court, however, noted the 
“uncertainty about [the Eleventh Circuit] precedent.”
142
  In 2008, the 
Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc sua sponte to resolve 
the constitutionality of strip searches of arrestees.
143
 
The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Carnes, overruled 
its precedent
144
 and held that blanket strip searches of arrestees dur-
ing the booking process are constitutional “provided that the 
searches are no more intrusive on privacy than those upheld in the 
Bell case.”
145
  Out of the twelve judges to hear the case, Judge Barkett 
was the sole dissenter.
146
  This decision departed from nearly thirty 
years of contrary decisions by the majority of circuit courts.
147
  The 
 
 135 Id. at 1300.  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. 
 139 Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“[Q]ualified 
immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individu-
al capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”(citation omitted)). 
 140 Id. at 1346 n.3, 1349−50. 
 141 Powell, 496 F.3d at 1310.  The court explained that “[u]nder the law of this Cir-
cuit, an arrestee to be detained in the general jail population has a constitutional 
right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from strip searches conducted with-
out reasonable suspicion that the detainee is concealing weapons, drugs, or other 
contraband.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1341−43 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(plaintiff arrested for driving under the influence)); Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 
678, 680−82 (11th Cir. 2000) (same)). 
 142 Id. at 1312 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc)).   
 143 Powell v. Barrett, No. 05-16734, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11705 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 
2008). 
 144 For a discussion of the Wilson case, see supra note 133.   
 145 Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 146 Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 147 See supra Part III.A.  
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Eleventh Circuit criticized the majority approach as misinterpreting 
that the Bell Court required reasonable suspicion in order to conduct 
a strip search and explained that 
[t]he Bell decision, correctly read, is inconsistent with the conclu-
sion that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion 
before an inmate entering or re-entering a detention facility may 
be subjected to a strip search that includes a body cavity inspec-
tion.  And the decision certainly is inconsistent with the conclu-
sion that reasonable suspicion is required for detention facility 
strip searches that do not involve body cavity inspections.
148
 
The Eleventh Circuit initially noted that Bell approved a blanket strip-
search policy that did not require individualized suspicion.
149
  The 
court, pointing to Justice Powell’s dissent in Bell, emphasized that Bell 
approved strip searches without any level of suspicion, and noted that 
Justice Powell would not have dissented if the majority required rea-
sonable suspicion for strip searches of detainees.
150
  One commenta-
tor noted, however, that the Eleventh Circuit ignored the fact that 
other courts post-Bell did not find Bell controlling because of the fac-
tual differences between the post-contact searches in Bell and 
searches conducted during booking procedures.
151
  Also, the Eleventh 
Circuit ultimately rejected the misdemeanor-felony distinction that 
some circuits have made in the context of strip searches in detention 
facilities.
152
 
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the need for institutional safety 
and security to justify the blanket strip-search policy.
153
  The court dis-
 
 148 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307.  
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 1308 (“If the majority had required reasonable suspicion for body cavity 
inspection strip searches of pretrial detainees, Justice Powell would not have dis-
sented at all.”). 
 151 Crampton, supra note 21, at 912; see also Allison v. GEO Grp., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 
2d 433, 459 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[The majority of circuits] did not hold that Bell ‘re-
quires’ reasonable suspicion; they held that Bell requires reasonableness and that 
reasonableness, in certain circumstances, requires that searches be based on indivi-
dualized suspicion of wrongdoing measured against some objective standard such as 
reasonable suspicion.”).  
 152 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1310 (“Those decisions are wrong. The difference between 
felonies and misdemeanors or other lesser offenses is without constitutional signific-
ance when it comes to detention facility strip searches. . . . The Supreme Court made 
no distinction in Bell between detainees based on whether they had been charged 
with misdemeanors or felonies or even with no crime at all. . . . It was a blanket policy 
applicable to all.”).  But see, e.g., Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 
1989); Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985); Mary Beth G. 
v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).  
 153 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1310.  
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cussed the problems of smuggling contraband into the facility and 
the threat it poses to employees.
154
  In the end, the court afforded 
great deference to the jail officials in implementing policies, namely 
the strip-search policy, to maintain security.
155
  The court acknowl-
edged that the plaintiffs’ “best hope for distinguishing Bell lies in the 
fact that they were strip searched as part of the booking process in-
stead of after contact visits.”
156
  The court rejected this distinction, 
however, explaining that arrestees would have just as much opportu-
nity to conceal contraband as the inmates in Bell because they had 
been in contact with the outside world for a long period of time and 
some were on notice of a pending arrest.
157
  The Eleventh Circuit ex-
plained that the security needs in Bell were “no greater than those” in 
this case and that the searches in Bell were actually “more intrusive” 
on the privacy interests of inmates.
158
  Accordingly, the court held that 
the less intrusive searches in Powell did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
159
 
In Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, departed from its precedent in a seven-to-four split
160
 
and upheld a policy that authorized strip searches of all arrestees be-
fore the arrestees entered the general prison population.
161
  In Bull, 
three judges joined Judge Thomas’s dissent.
162
  Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Ikuta explained that “the scope, manner, and justification 
for San Francisco’s strip-search policy was not meaningfully different 
from the scope, manner, and justification for the strip-search policy 
in Bell.”
163
  The Ninth Circuit noted that, based on the record, which 
showed a “pervasive and serious problem with contraband inside San 
Francisco’s jails,” the justification for searches of arrestees during in-
take was even stronger than the justification in Bell.
164
  In addition, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the policies were reasonable because the cir-
cumstances in Bull were “not meaningfully distinguishable from those 
presented in Bell,” and therefore the jail’s justifications for the 
 
 154 Id. at 1310−11. 
 155 Id. at 1311.  
 156 Id. at 1313.  
 157 Id. at 1314.  
 158 Id. at 1302.  
 159 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1302.  
 160 595 F.3d 964, 981 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 161 Id. at 966.  
 162 Id. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 163 Id. at 975 (majority opinion). 
 164 Id. 
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searches outweighed the invasion of personal rights that the searches 
caused.
165
 
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT JOINS THE RECENT TREND TO UPHOLD 
BLANKET STRIP-SEARCH POLICIES 
As previously described, jail officials conducted a strip and visual 
body cavity search of Albert Florence upon admittance to both BCJ 
and ECCF.
166
  The policy at BCJ provided the following: 
A physical search of an inmate by the same sex officer while un-
clothed consisting of routine and systematic visual observation of 
the inmate’s physical body to look for distinguished identifying 
marks, scars or deformities, signs of illness, injury or disease 
and/or the concealment of contraband on the inmate’s body.
167
 
The policy at ECCF provided that 
all arrestees were to be strip searched and required to shower . . . . 
A strip search . . . is to consist of an officer observ[ing] carefully 
while the inmate undresses and examining the arrestee’s ears, 
nose, hair and scalp, the interior of the mouth, fingers, hands, 
arms and armpits, and all body openings and the inner thighs.
168
 
After being released, Florence filed a federal class-action suit 
against BCJ, ECCF, and various individuals and municipal entities 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
169
  In his suit, Florence asserted various con-
stitutional violations, including a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
the strip-search procedures at both jails.
170
  On March 20, 2008, the 
district court granted Florence’s motion for class certification on his 
 
 165 Id. at 975.  
 166 For a discussion of the facts of Florence, see supra notes 1−12 and accompanying 
text.  
 167 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 300 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011) (quoting BURLINGTON CNTY. DET. CTR./CORRS. & 
WORK RELEASE CTR., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: SEARCH OF INMATES § 1186). 
 168 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY GEN. 
ORDER NO. 89-17 (2002)).  
 169 Id. at 299.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may have a cause of action for 
certain violations of his constitutional rights.  Section 1983 provides in relevant part:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 170 Florence, 621 F.3d at 299.  
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strip-search claims.
171
  After evaluating the strip-search policies, the 
district court held that the procedures failed to survive the Bell ba-
lancing test and “that blanket strip searches of non-indictable offend-
ers, performed without reasonable suspicion for drugs, weapons, or 
other contraband, is [sic] unconstitutional.”
172
  The Third Circuit 
granted permission to appeal and the district court certified the fol-
lowing issue: “[W]hether a blanket policy of strip searching all non-
indictable arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first articulating 
reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution as applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
173
 
While the issue was one of first impression for the Third Circuit, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell and many other post-Bell cases 
guided the court’s analysis.
174
  Since the court faced a circuit split, its 
task was to “determine which line of cases is more faithful to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bell.”
175
  Before examining prior case law, 
the Third Circuit set forth various general standards concerning 
Fourth Amendment challenges by arrestees.
176
  The court noted that 
there is a “circumscription or loss of many significant rights” that 
comes with detention in a correctional facility.
177
  Based on the nature 
of prisons and the need to accommodate the various institutional ob-
jectives, prison officials must curtail certain rights—including a de-
tainee’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
178
  The Third Circuit 
 
 171 Id. at 299.  The plaintiff class was defined as follows:  
All arrestees charged with non-indictable offenses who were processed, 
housed or held over at Defendant Burlington County Jail and/or De-
fendant Essex County Correctional Facility from March 3, 2003 to the 
present date who were directed by Defendants’ officers to strip naked 
before those officers, no matter if the officers term that procedure a 
‘visual observation’ or otherwise, without the officers first articulating a 
reasonable belief that those arrestees were concealing contraband, 
drugs or weapons . . . . 
Id. at 300 (citation omitted). 
 172 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 513 (D.N.J. 2009), 
rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 173 Florence, 621 F.3d at 301(citation omitted).  
 174 Id. at 298−99.  
 175 Id. at 299.    
 176 See id. at 301−02.  
 177 Id. at 301 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984)); see Hudson, 
468 U.S. at 526 (holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in their prison cells).  It is important to note, however, that the Court in Hudson 
addressed prisoners’ privacy rights in their cells, while the Third Circuit in Florence 
addressed bodily privacy rights.   
 178 Florence, 621 F.3d at 301.  
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explained that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that prisons 
are not beyond the reach of the Constitution,” but also recognized 
that detention facilities should be afforded a great deal of deference 
with respect to implementing management policies and proce-
dures.
179
 
Following this brief background, the Third Circuit provided a 
detailed review of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish.
180
  
The court then explained that post-Bell, “ten circuit courts of appeals 
applied the Supreme Court’s balancing test to strip searches of indi-
viduals arrested for minor offenses and found the searches unconsti-
tutional where not supported by reasonable suspicion that the arres-
tee was hiding a weapon or contraband.”
181
  Generally, the majority of 
circuits found that the extreme invasion of the arrestee’s privacy out-
weighed the prison’s interest in conducting the search.
182
  These 
courts found that the “critical factor” in these cases was that individu-
als arrested for minor offenses posed only a slight security risk based 
on the unexpected nature of the arrests, in comparison to the 
planned contact visits in Bell.
183
 
The court then discussed the recent trend of courts overturning 
precedent to uphold blanket strip-search policies in the Eleventh and 
Ninth Circuits and analyzed both Powell and Bull.
184
  The court ex-
plained that “the Bull court relied on much of the same reasoning as 
the Eleventh Circuit in Powell, including its view that decisions inter-
preting Bell v. Wolfish to require reasonable suspicion to strip search 
minor offenders were analytically flawed.”
185
  The Third Circuit noted 
that, in the case at hand, both jails relied on Powell to argue that their 
strip-search policies satisfied the reasonableness standard of Bell be-
cause the jails’ interests in prison security applied to all offenders.
186
  
On the other hand, Florence argued that the district court properly 
 
 179 Id. at 302 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 
(1979)).  
 180 See id. at 302.  For a discussion of the Bell case, see supra Part II.B.  
 181 Florence, 621 F.3d at 303−04 (citing ten circuit court decisions); see also discus-
sion supra Part III.A.  
 182 Florence, 621 F.3d at 304. 
 183 Id.  
 184 Id. at 305−06 (citing Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc); Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc)). For a discussion of both Powell and Bull, see also supra Part III.C . 
 185 Florence, 621 F.3d. at 305−06 (internal citations omitted).  
 186 Id. at 306. 
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applied Bell and urged the court to adopt the reasonable suspicion 
test that the majority of circuit courts apply.
187
 
After discussing the circuit split, the Third Circuit applied the 
Bell balancing test.
188
  First, the court considered the scope of the 
searches at issue.  The court explained that, in one of its previous de-
cisions, the court had recognized that strip searches constitute a “sig-
nificant intrusion on an individual’s privacy.”
189
  In that case, the strip-
search policies at issue “require[d] the arrestees to undress complete-
ly and submit to a visual observation of their naked bodies before tak-
ing a supervised shower.”
190
  Although the court acknowledged the in-
vasion of privacy caused by a strip search, it concluded that the 
searches in the case at hand were less intrusive than the searches in 
Bell.
191
  Next, the court noted that the manner and place of the 
searches at issue were similar to the manner and place of the searches 
in Bell; correctional officers conducted the searches at detention facil-
ities, in private, under sanitary conditions, in a professional manner, 
and the searches were brief in duration.
192
  Overall, the court found 
that “because the scope, manner, and place of the searches [were] 
similar to or less intrusive than those in Bell, the only factor on which 
Plaintiffs could distinguish this case [was] the Jails’ justification for 
the searches.”
193
 
The court next examined the jails’ justifications for the searches.  
In this regard, the court observed that New Jersey jails face serious 
gang problems.
194
  The jails set forth three specific security interests as 
justification for their strip-search policies: (1) detecting and deterring 
smuggling of weapons or contraband, (2) identifying gang members 
based on tattoos, and (3) preventing disease.
195
  The Third Circuit 
found that the smuggling of contraband into the jails created a major 
threat to security and constituted a legitimate concern to prison ad-
ministrators.
196
 
 
 187 Id.  
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. at 307 (quoting United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 190 Id.  
 191 Florence, 621 F.3d at 307.  
 192 Id.   
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. (citing Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 521−22 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. (“Prevention of the entry of illegal weapons and drugs is vital to the protec-
tion of inmates and prison personnel alike.”). 
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Ultimately, the Third Circuit joined the Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits.  Writing for the majority, Judge Hardiman concluded that “the 
security interest in preventing smuggling at the time of intake is as 
strong as the interest in preventing smuggling after the contact visits 
at issue in Bell.”
197
  Thus, in a two-to-one decision, the Third Circuit 
held that the strip-search procedures at BCJ and ECCF were reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.
198
  First, the court explained that Bell 
“explicitly rejected any distinction in security risk based on the reason 
for detention.”
199
  Next, the court discussed how Bell addressed an 
overall policy applied to every inmate; thus the court rejected the 
need for individualized suspicion.
200
  The Third Circuit rejected 
plaintiffs’ claim that the security risk of smuggling contraband is low 
for minor offenders because of the surprising nature of the arrests.
201
  
The court explained that arrests are not always unanticipated and 
that excluding minor offenders from strip searches would only in-
duce gang members to exploit the system.
202
  The court also noted 
that, in Bell, the opportunity to smuggle contraband into the facility 
was low, but the court still found the search reasonable.
203
  The Third 
Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the jails could not claim 
that they were preventing smuggling in the absence of evidence of a 
smuggling problem.
204
  In fact, in Bell, the Supreme Court viewed the 
absence of a record showing a problem as an indication that the poli-
cy served a deterrent function.
205
  Thus, the Third Circuit interpreted 
Bell not to require jails to produce a record of smuggling problems.
206
 
Finally like Bell, the court in Florence found that courts must ac-
cord substantial deference to the judgments of the prison administra-
tors, especially when the record does not indicate a smuggling prob-
lem because “[a] detention facility need not suffer a pattern of 
security breaches before it takes [reasonable] steps to prevent 
them.”
207
  The Third Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
jails could prevent smuggling through less intrusive searches, such as 
 
 197 Florence, 621 F.3d at 308.  
 198 Id. at 311.  
 199 Id. at 308 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979)). 
 200 Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 560). 
 201 Id. at 308.  
 202 Id. at 308−09 (citing Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008)).  
 203 Florence, 621 F.3d at 309. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559). 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 310.  
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searches through the use of a Body Orifice Scanning System (“BOSS 
Chair”).
208
  The court explained that, in Bell, the Supreme Court re-
jected the use of less intrusive means for evaluating searches because 
these means were ineffective.
209
  Similarly, the Third Circuit rejected 
the use of the BOSS Chair as an alternative to strip searches because 
the device would not be able to detect drugs and non-metallic con-
traband.
210
  Finally, the Third Circuit concluded that a blanket strip-
search policy promotes the equal treatment of all arrestees and re-
moves the potential for abuse, especially when compared to the po-
tential for abuse present under a “reasonable suspicion” standard, 
under which various subjective characteristics are taken into consid-
eration.
211
 
It is important to note that, unlike the en banc decisions of the 
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in Powell and Bull respectively, a panel of 
three Third Circuit judges decided Florence by a two-to-one margin.  
Judge Pollak dissented from the majority opinion and stated that he 
would reaffirm the district court’s decision.
212
  While the majority 
found the Powell and Bull decisions persuasive, Judge Pollak found 
“greater wisdom in Judge Barkett’s dissent in Powell and Judge Tho-
mas’s dissent in Bull.”
213
 
In pointing to Judge Thomas’s dissent, Judge Pollak agreed that, 
like the majority in Bull, the majority ignored “‘twenty-five years of ju-
risprudence’” and essentially “‘discard[ed] Bell’s requirement of bal-
ance.’”
214
  The majority gave jailers “the unfettered right” to conduct 
strip searches of any individual arrested for minor offenses.
215
  Judge 
Pollak found Judge Thomas’s observation that “[t]he rationale for 
[the majority’s] abrupt departure is founded on quicksand” persua-
sive.
216
  In Bull, the government argued that, because jail officials 
found contraband, arrestees must have smuggled it in the facility.
217
  
 
 208 Id. (“[T]he Body Orifice Scanning System (BOSS Chair) [is] ‘[a] non-intrusive 
scanning system designed to detect small weapons or contraband metal objects con-
cealed in oral, anal, or vaginal cavities’.’” (third alteration in original)). 
 209 Florence, 621 F.3d at 310.  
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. at 310−11.  
 212 Id. at 311 (Pollak, J., dissenting). 
 213 Id.  
 214 Id. (quoting Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 990 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 215 Florence, 621 F.3d at 311 (Pollak, J., dissenting).  
 216 Id.  
 217 Id. at 312 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (quoting Bull, 595 F.3d at 990 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)).  
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Judge Thomas rejected this argument, finding no support in the 
record that arrestees were smuggling contraband.
218
  Similarly, Judge 
Pollak noted that, in the case at hand, “neither county submit[ed] 
supporting affidavits that detail[ed] evidence of a smuggling problem 
specific to their respective facilities.”
219
  Judge Pollak also relied on 
Judge Barkett’s dissent in Powell.  More specifically, Judge Pollak ob-
served that Judge Barkett’s dissent powerfully recognized the need to 
afford deference to jail administrators but did not underestimate the 
fact that individuals do not forfeit all of their constitutional protec-
tions upon admittance to a custodial facility.
220
  Quoting Judge Bar-
kett, Judge Pollak explained that “‘[t]hese protections, such as the 
right to be free from degrading, humiliating, and dehumanizing 
treatment and the right to bodily integrity, include protection against 
forced nakedness during strip searches in front of others.’”
221
 
V. THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED 
Although the Third Circuit joined the recent trend of courts 
upholding blanket strip-search policies, this decision was wrong.  The 
Third Circuit should have affirmed the district court’s holding that 
the blanket strip-search policies of BCJ and ECCF, which allow strip 
searches of all arrestees charged with minor offenses during booking, 
are unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment.
222
  The Third 
Circuit should have adopted the reasonable suspicion standard that 
the majority of circuit courts support because it strikes the proper 
balance between the government’s legitimate interests in jail security 
and arrestees’ significant privacy interests. 
Essentially, the Third Circuit’s decision in Florence upholds a pol-
icy that not only disregards decisions from district courts within the 
Third Circuit,
223
 but also ignores the overwhelming majority of deci-
 
 218 Id.  
 219 Id. at 312 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 
513 (D.N.J. 2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 
(2011)). 
 220 Id. at 312 (citing Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (Bar-
kett, J., dissenting)).  
 221 Florence, 621 F.3d at 312 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell, 541 F.3d at 
1315) (Barkett, J., dissenting)).  
 222 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 511−12 (D.N.J. 
2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d. Cir 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 223 See id. at 505−06 (citing DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F. Supp. 610, 622 
(D.N.J. 1990); Ernst v. Borough of Fort Lee, 739 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D.N.J. 1990);  
O’Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D.N.J. 1988)); Da-
vis v. City of Camden, 657 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that plaintiff’s 
rights were violated when plaintiff was strip searched without reasonable suspicion as 
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sions from other circuits.
224
  Although district court decisions and de-
cisions from other circuits are not binding on the Third Circuit, they 
undeniably serve as persuasive precedent and useful guideposts for 
analyzing strip-search claims.
225
  Rather than following this over-
whelming majority of decisions, the Third Circuit relied on the Ele-
venth and Ninth Circuits’ erroneous interpretations of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish.  The Third Circuit in Florence, like 
the majority in Powell v. Barrett, erred by “read[ing] the balancing test 
out of Bell and effectively establish[ing] a per se rule permitting au-
tomatic strip searches of all detainees, regardless of their status, in 
the name of security and administrative convenience.”
226
 
The major flaw in the Third Circuit’s analysis is its failure to rec-
ognize the difference between arrestees strip searched at intake and 
an inmate strip searched after a contact visit.
227
  Although the Su-
preme Court in Bell upheld a blanket strip-search policy after contact 
visits with outsiders, such a policy is not always permissible in other 
contexts.  One district court within the Third Circuit explained that 
the Bell Court “did not have occasion to rule on the reasonableness of 
custodial strip searches in other circumstances or under what cir-
cumstances reasonable suspicion might be required.”
228
  Application 
of the Bell balancing test to a blanket strip-search policy of arrestees 
charged with minor offenses necessitates a different balance than that 
applied in the context of post-contact visits.  Thus, as the majority of 
circuits have held, the Bell holding should not directly control cases 
dealing with blanket strip searches of arrestees charged with minor 
offenses.
229
  The Third Circuit, nonetheless, found that the searches 
were similar or less intrusive than those in Bell and noted that the on-
 
part of a blanket policy applied by jail)); see also Allison v. GEO Grp., Inc., 611 F. 
Supp 2d 433 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Delandro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 06-927, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 111979 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009); Martinez v. Warner, No. 07-3213, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44395 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2008); Owens v. Cnty. of Delaware, No. 95-
4282, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12098 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1996).   
 224 See Florence, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 505−07. 
 225 See id. at 509 (“[The Eleventh Circuit] not only overruled its own precedent, it 
also rejected the persuasive precedent of several circuits that distinguish misdemea-
nor-booking procedure from that of felony.”). 
 226 Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J., dissenting); 
see also Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority discards Bell’s requirement to balance the need 
for a search against individual privacy . . . .”). 
 227 See supra notes 103−04 and accompanying text.  
 228 Allison v. GEO Grp., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433, 459 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 229 See Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271−72 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that Bell was not controlling because the searches in Bell were “initiated 
under different circumstances”). 
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ly way in which plaintiffs could distinguish Bell would be based on the 
jails’ justification for the searches.
230
  The justifications for initiating 
the searches in Bell, namely to prevent and deter the smuggling of 
contraband, are not equivalent to the justifications for strip searches 
in the booking context.
231
  The Third Circuit improperly relied on 
both jails’ justifications for the searches, which were to detect and de-
ter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other contraband, to sup-
port its decision.
232
  Unlike contact visits, however, arrests for minor 
offenses are typically unplanned events; it is unlikely that an individu-
al arrested for a minor offense would have the opportunity to plan to 
smuggle contraband into the detention facility.
233
  Less intrusive 
searches, such as pat-downs, would be effective in discovering any 
contraband that an arrestee may be concealing.
234
  Furthermore, even 
if an arrestee had an opportunity to conceal contraband, imposing a 
standard of reasonable suspicion permits officials to strip search an 
arrestee in a constitutionally permissible manner when such concerns 
arise.  Based on the unexpected nature of an arrest, simply no deter-
rence effect is likely.
235
 
The Third Circuit failed to strike the proper balance between 
the privacy interests of arrestees and a jail’s security needs.  On the 
one hand, the court was correct in recognizing that jails are inherent-
ly dangerous places with legitimate security concerns.  The court cor-
rectly noted that jails in New Jersey, like most correctional facilities, 
 
 230 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 231 See Crampton, supra note 21, at 916 (“[T]he majority, [in Powell] unfairly, and 
without much thought, deems the justifications behind a post-contact visit search as 
equal to that of a booking policy search.  As discussed earlier in Roberts and Shain, 
such comparison should not be made because there exist two fundamental factual 
distinctions between the two types of searches: (1) the frequency of contraband be-
ing smuggled into the institutions for each type of search; and (2) the effectiveness 
as a deterrent for each type of search.”).  
 232 See Florence, 621 F.3d at 307.  
 233 See Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d. Cir. 2001) (“Unlike persons already in 
jail who receive contact visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are 
about to be arrested and thus an opportunity to hide something.”); see also Powell v. 
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1318 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s assertion that 
pretrial detainees . . . might anticipate their arrests or that gang members might de-
liberately get arrested in order to smuggle weapons and drugs into jail is unwar-
ranted speculation in this case.”).    
 234 Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[L]ess invasive 
(and less constitutionally problematic) searches would have been equally effective in 
revealing contraband [possessed by detained arrestees].”). 
 235 Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by Bull v. City & 
Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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face serious gang problems.
236
  In fact, there may be a legitimate justi-
fication for strip searching many arrestees upon arrival, and the rea-
sonable suspicion standard would allow jails to search such arrestees.  
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit overlooked the severe privacy intru-
sion that arrestees suffer.
237
  Under the current strip-search policies at 
BCJ and ECCF, anyone can be strip searched.  In the Florence district 
court opinion, Judge Rodriguez opined that such a policy creates an 
unreasonable result because “a hypothetical priest or minister ar-
rested for allegedly skimming the Sunday collection would be sub-
jected to the same degrading procedure as a gang-member arrested 
on an allegation of drug charges.”
238
 
Under the Third Circuit’s ruling, individuals who have commit-
ted minor offenses, such as unpaid traffic tickets or failure to pay 
child support, can be subjected to strip searches upon arrival to a de-
tention facility.  Absent some level of particularized suspicion, these 
individuals do not deserve to have their rights violated or to be sub-
jected to such unreasonable searches.  Another district court in the 
Third Circuit found that “[f]or offenses that are relatively minor, a 
strip search represents a grossly disproportionate consequence of ar-
rest.”
239
  Florence’s attorney, Susan Chana Lask, explained “that what 
happened to her client could ‘happen to anyone’ and that those ac-
cused of being nonviolent offenders should be thought about and 
treated differently than murder suspects and criminals.”
240
  Nearly 
every circuit court, with the exception of the Eleventh, Ninth, and 
 
 236 Florence, 621 F.3d at 307. 
 237 See Jason Grant, His Public Stand on Private Shame over Strip-Search, THE STAR 
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 24, 2011, at 1.  Florence explained the fear and degrada-
tion that came with the strip search at Burlington County:  
It was horrible . . . .  I can even remember looking at a couple of the of-
ficers and one of them had a grin on his face.  And then you look to 
your left or the right of you, and you know, it seems like another guy is 
looking at you, and it’s—it’s disgusting, very disgusting. 
Id.  Florence went on to explain that the strip search at Essex County was even worse 
than the one at Burlington: “You’re in there with convicted felons, murderers, car-
jackers, every walk of life . . . and everybody’s laughing . . . and here I am sitting 
wondering if my life is over: financially, emotionally, and my personal life, if that’s 
over.”  Id.  
 238 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 512. (D.N.J. 
2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 239 Allison v. GEO Grp., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
 240 Grant, supra note 237.  Lask went on to explain that “there’s a practical fix, 
which is to physically separate the noncriminal offenders (in the correctional facili-
ties) from the murderers and rapists.”  Id.   
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now the Third Circuit, find these strip-search policies to be extremely 
offensive and humiliating.
241
 
Finally, the Third Circuit’s decision is also inconsistent with the 
requirements of New Jersey’s strip-search statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:161A-
1(a),
242
 the American Bar Association’s (ABA) strip-search standard,
243
 
and laws regarding strip searches for arrestees of minor offenses in 
many other states,
244
 which all require at least reasonable suspicion for 
strip searches.
245
  Although the plaintiffs in Florence did not attack the 
legality of BCJ and ECCF’s policies under these provisions, they serve 
as useful indicators of the appropriate standard in the context of ar-
restee strip searches.  In 1993, pursuant to N.J.S.A 2A:161A-8,
246
 the 
 
 241 See supra Part III.A. 
 242 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1 (West 2010) (“A person who has been detained or 
arrested for commission of an offense other than a crime shall not be subject to a 
strip search unless . . . (c) The person is lawfully confined in a municipal detention 
facility or an adult county correctional facility and the search is based on a reasonable 
suspicion that a weapon, controlled dangerous substance . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 243 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, Standard 23-
6.10(f),(“[A] search requiring a prisoner to disrobe, including visual inspection of 
body cavities, should be conducted only when based upon an articulable suspicion that 
the prisoner is carrying contraband or other prohibited material.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 244  See Helmer, supra note 18, at 264 n.141 (“Several current state statutes also ex-
pressly limit their application of the Fourth Amendment protections to misdemea-
nants and minor offenders.”); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(f) (LEXIS through 
2011 urgency Ch. 745 & Extra. Sess. Ch. 16) (reasonable suspicion); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. 2011) (reasonable belief); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 54-33l(a) (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.) (reasonable belief); FLA. STAT. § 
901.211(2)(a) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 269) (probable cause); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/103-1(c) (LEXIS through 2011 Acts 97-598, and 97-602) (reasonable belief); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.30 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.) (probable cause); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-2521(a) (LEXIS through 2010 Supp.) (probable cause); 501 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS. 3:120 § 3(1)(B) (LEXIS through Oct. 2011) (reasonable suspicion); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 200-G(2)(A) (LEXIS through Ch. 447 2011 1st Reg. Sess.) (rea-
sonable cause); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.25a (LEXIS through 2011 P.A. 130) 
(reasonable cause); MO. REV. STAT. § 544.193(4) (LEXIS through 2d Reg. Sess. 2010) 
(probable cause); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.32 (LEXIS through legislation passed 
by 129th Gen. Assembly 2011) (probable cause); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-119(b) 
(LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (reasonable belief); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59.1(A) 
(LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess. cc. 1–890 & Special Sess.) (reasonable cause); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.79.130 (2011) (reasonable suspicion or probable cause); WIS. STAT. § 
968.255 (LEXIS through  Act 8 2011) (probable cause).  
 245 See Brief for Former Attorneys General of New Jersey et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at *3−8, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-
945, (June 24, 2011). 
 246 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-8(b) (West 2010) (“[T]he Attorney General shall 
issue guidelines . . . for police officers governing the release and confinement of per-
sons who have been arrested for commission of an offense other than a crime and 
such guidelines governing the performance of strip and body cavity searches . . . .”).   
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Attorney General of New Jersey promulgated The Attorney General’s 
Strip Search and Body Cavity Search Requirements and Procedures for Police 
Officers, which permit strip searches in municipal detention facilities 
based on a search warrant, consent, or reasonable suspicion that an 
individual is concealing a weapon or other contraband.
247
  These 
guidelines are similar to the ABA’s strip-search standard, which re-
quires an “articulable suspicion” that an arrestee is concealing con-
traband.
248
  Additionally, like the New Jersey Legislature, many other 
state legislatures have provided statutory protection to their citizens 
by requiring at least reasonable suspicion for strip searches of arres-
tees for minor offenses.
249
  Accordingly, the blanket strip-search poli-
cies at BCJ and ECCF would violate the New Jersey strip-search sta-
tute, the ABA’s standard, and the statutes of other states, all of which 
require at least reasonable suspicion. 
Generally, states are allowed, through their constitutions, to pro-
vide greater protection to their citizens than is afforded to those citi-
zens by the U.S. Constitution.
250
  After examining the New Jersey Con-
stitution and the New Jersey strip search statute, it appears that the 
plaintiffs may have been better off bringing this claim in state court 
rather than in federal court.
251
  For example, in State v. Sheppard, the 
 
 247 N.J. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S STRIP SEARCH AND BODY 
CAVITY SEARCH REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR POLICE OFFICERS II.A.1. (1993), 
available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/stripout.htm.  
 248 See supra note 243. 
 249 See supra note 244. 
 250 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey explained that “the United States Supreme Court has long proclaimed 
that state Constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual liberties 
than the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 300 (internal citations omitted).  Moreo-
ver, the court noted that it had previously “recognized that [the New Jersey] state 
Constitution may provide greater protection than the federal Constitution.”  Id. (in-
ternal citations omitted); see also State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 959–60 (N.J. 1982) (cit-
ing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)); Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 718 (1975) (explaining that the U.S. Constitution establishes the minimum 
amount of protection that a state must afford to constitutional rights and that states 
may provide further protections to its citizens by further limiting state powers).    
 251 See State v. Hayes, 743 A.2d 378 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).  The court 
explained that in addition to constitutional limitations on searches, strip searches are 
regulated by statute.  Id. at 380−81 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1 (West 2010)).  
Moreover, “[s]ection 1c permits a strip search of a person lawfully confined in a mu-
nicipal detention facility based on reasonable suspicion, provided the search is autho-
rized under regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of 
Corrections.” Id. at 382 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
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Superior Court of New Jersey looked to the New Jersey Constitution
252
 
and held that an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches was violated when, prior to incarceration, the arrestee was 
strip searched absent probable cause that the he was concealing wea-
pons or contraband.
253
  The individual was arrested for motor vehicle 
violations and incarcerated solely due to his inability to post bail.
254
  
The court chastised the blanket strip-search policy that the police 
implemented and explained that it could not approve such a policy 
“in a free society that passionately embraces the tenets of its constitu-
tion.”
255
  Whether it was an oversight, a case of bad lawyering, or a 
strategic decision, Florence may have been better off filing suit in 
state court based on violations of the New Jersey Constitution and the 
New Jersey strip-search statute. 
VI. THE RIGHT CASE AT THE WRONG TIME:  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ROBERTS COURT DECIDING FLORENCE 
Based on the various lower courts’ approaches, it is evident that 
there is a significant level of confusion over the constitutionality of 
strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses.  The circuit 
courts are irreconcilably divided over whether the Fourth Amend-
ment permits suspicion-less strip searches of individuals arrested for 
minor offenses.  Recognizing the constitutional import of Florence’s 
suit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florence v. Board of Cho-
sen Freeholders on April 4, 2011.
256
  The Court heard oral arguments on 
October 12, 2011.
257
  Thereafter, the Court will likely set a uniform 
standard to evaluate Fourth Amendment challenges to strip-search 
policies of arrestees of minor offenses in detention facilities outside 
of the post-contact visit context.
258
  In ruling on this issue, the Court 
 
 252 See N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 7 (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the papers and things to be seized.”). 
 253 483 A.2d 235 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1984). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 239. 
 256 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). 
 257 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 
10-945 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2011/2011_10_945%23argument. 
 258 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of strip-search poli-
cies in detention facilities since Bell, the Court has addressed strip-search policies in 
contexts outside of the arrestee/detainee context.  In 2009, in Safford Unified School 
Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), the Supreme Court, in a six-to-three rul-
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should reverse the Third Circuit and adopt the approach that the ma-
jority of circuit courts take: it is unreasonable and unconstitutional 
for a correctional facility to strip search a person arrested for a minor 
offense unless authorities have “reasonable suspicion” that the indi-
vidual is concealing a weapon or other contraband.  The Supreme 
Court should adopt the “reasonable suspicion” approach because it 
strikes the proper balance between a jail’s legitimate justifications for 
strip searches and the severe intrusion into the privacy interests of 
individuals arrested for minor offenses. 
Since the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue for over 
thirty years, and the record is well developed in this case, it appears 
that Florence is an ideal vehicle to resolve this conflict among the cir-
cuits.  The problem for the plaintiffs, however, is the current compo-
sition of the Supreme Court.  The jurisprudence of the Fourth 
Amendment varies depending on who is on the bench.
259
  The cur-
rent Supreme Court, under Chief Justice John G. Roberts’s leader-
ship, is the most conservative Court in decades.
260
  In his book, The 
Evolution of the Fourth Amendment, Thomas McInnis explains that the 
Roberts Court has ruled on ten cases involving the Fourth Amend-
ment in the past three terms.
261
  McInnis found several commonalities 
in these cases, namely the use of the reasonableness approach and 
victories for the government.
262
  Accordingly, individuals who chal-
lenge the government’s action in Fourth Amendment cases “will have 
a high hurdle to overcome, because the presumption exists among at 
least five members of the Court that the governmental interest in law 
enforcement . . . will usually trump the individual’s interest in priva-
cy.”
263
  Arguably, four of the six most conservative justices out of the 
 
ing, decided a case dealing with a strip search in the school context.  The Court held 
that a strip search of a student by school officials violated the student’s Fourth 
Amendment rights “[b]ecause there was no reason to suspect the drugs presented a 
danger or were concealed in her underwear.”  Id. at 2637.  The Court reiterated that 
such searches must be based on reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 2643.  Although this was 
a recent decision by the Court, it is not relevant or applicable to this case because Flo-
rence deals with an entirely different context—namely strip searches of pretrial detai-
nees in detention facilities. 
 259 MCINNIS, supra note 55, at 271 (“The Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment allowed government to engage in a broader array of 
searches and seizures than had the Warren Court. This demonstrates that the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment can change depending on who is on the Court.”). 
 260 Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, at 
A1, July 24, 2010.   
 261 MCINNIS, supra note 55, at 271. 
 262 Id.   
 263 Id. at 283.  
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forty-four who have been on the bench since 1937 are currently serv-
ing, including Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice Scalia, and 
Justice Thomas.
264
  McInnis further explained that 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas are all consis-
tent conservative voices who are not likely to use the Fourth 
Amendment to narrow the government’s power to search and sei-
zure. Their votes, along with Justice Scalia’s, provide a solid bloc 
of four votes which will usually support the government’s power 
to search and seize. 
265
 
In addition to this conservative force, Justice Kennedy, the swing 
Justice sitting on the Roberts Court, is considered to be one of the 
ten most conservative justices on the bench since 1937.
266
  McInnis 
notes that “[t]he direction of the Court’s Fourth Amendment juri-
sprudence when there are close cases will temporarily hinge on the 
votes of Justice Kennedy.”
267
  In the cases in which the Court split last 
term, Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives in nine out twelve 
cases.
268
  Furthermore, the additions of neither Justice Kagan nor Jus-
tice Sotomayor are likely to affect the ideological balance of the 
Court, as both Justices replaced other liberals, namely Justice Stevens 
and Justice Souter.
269
 
Although the plaintiff class in Florence could not have waited to 
petition the Court until the ideology shifted towards a more liberal 
approach, based on the strong conservative leanings of the Roberts 
Court it is unlikely that the Court will rule in plaintiffs’ favor.  As pre-
viously noted, the plaintiffs may have been better off bringing their 
claims in state court.
270
  Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court has al-
ready granted certiorari on the case, only time will tell whether the 
ideologies of the Roberts Court hold true. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
In Florence, The Third Circuit erred in upholding a blanket strip-
search policy of all arrestees charged with minor offenses upon their 
admission to both BJC and ECCF.  In 1979, the Supreme Court, in 
 
 264 Liptak, supra note 260. 
 265 MCINNIS, supra note 55, at 283−84. 
 266 Liptak, supra note 260. 
 267 MCINNIS, supra note 55, at 283−84. 
 268 Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority is Making Its 
Mark, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at 17.  This article discusses the ideology of the Court 
prior to the replacement of Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan.   
 269 Liptak, supra note 260. 
 270 See supra text accompanying notes 251–55. 
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Bell v. Wolfish, examined a policy at MCC mandating strip searches of 
all inmates after contact visits.  The Court articulated a balancing test 
that became the central inquiry in analyzing the constitutionality of 
strip searches.  In Bell, the Court held that the strip-search policy 
could be conducted on less than probable cause because the security 
interests of the facility outweighed the privacy interests of the in-
mates.  Due to the ambiguity of the Court’s decision in Bell, lower 
courts did not have much guidance on how to apply the holding to 
strip-search policies in contexts outside of post-contact visits.  None-
theless, over the past thirty years, the overwhelming majority of cir-
cuit and district court decisions used Bell as a guidepost and adopted 
the reasonable suspicion standard in evaluating the constitutionality 
of strip-search policies in the booking context. 
The Third Circuit, like both the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, 
overlooked these cases, and in doing so misinterpreted the holding 
in Bell by failing to recognize the factual differences between Florence 
and Bell.  While courts should use the Bell balancing test as a starting 
point in analyzing Fourth Amendment challenges, the Bell decision 
should be limited to the context of post-contact searches.  The prop-
er standard for evaluating the constitutionality of strip searches of ar-
restees for minor offenses is to require that jail officials have reasona-
ble suspicion that individuals are concealing weapons or other 
contraband in order to conduct a strip search that passes constitu-
tional muster.  The Third Circuit’s decision does not strike the prop-
er balance between a jail’s security interest and an individual’s privacy 
interest.  The court failed to give credence to the degrading nature of 
and severe privacy intrusion that arrestees suffer during a strip 
search.  Thus, despite decades of well-settled law regarding blanket 
strip-search policies of arrestees for minor offenses, the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders has caused fur-
ther uncertainty concerning the proper standard to evaluate strip 
searches.  The law is now in flux as the pendulum continues to swing 
in the wrong direction, and the Fourth Amendment rights of indi-
viduals arrested for minor offenses edges closer to the bottom of the 
pit.  The Supreme Court will ultimately bring that pendulum to a halt 
when it decides Florence’s appeal. 
 
